Truth	in	Brentano Johannes	L.	Brandl How	to	understand	Brentano's	account	of	truth	is	a	question	of	some	controversy.	A number	of	different	views	have	been	put	forward	as	positions	that	Brentano	held	at some	stage	in	his	career.	The	received	view	has	it	that	the	early	Brentano	subscribed	to a	form	of	correspondence	theory	which	he	later	rejected	in	favor	of	a	definition	of	truth in	terms	of	correct	judging,	where	the	correctness	of	a	judgment	is	defined	in	terms	of the	notion	of	self-evidence	(see	Kraus	1966,	Szrednicki	1965,	Stegmüller	1969,	Kamitz 1983,	Chrudzimski	2001).	This	fundamental	shift	in	Brentano's view	is	regarded	as	a change	from	an	ontological	to	a	"gnoseological",	i.e.	epistemic,	theory	of	truth	(see	Kastil 1934).	Brentano's	mature	view	is	sometimes	said	to	resemble	a	neo-Kantian	conception of	truth	or	related	views	(see	Kraus	1966,	van	der	Schaar	1999,	2003),	it	has	been compared	with	a	coherence	theory	of	truth	(see	Krantz	1990/91),	and	it	is	regarded	as embracing	a	form	of	alethic	anti-realism	that	places	a	substantial	epistemic	constraint on	the	concept	of	truth	(see	Künne	2003).	More	recently,	Charles	Parsons	suggested	that the	early	Brentano	may	also	be	regarded	as	a	precursor	of	a	deflationist	theory	of	truth (see	Parsons	2004).	Following	up	on	this	proposal,	the	received	view	has	been challenged	by	a	new	interpretation	that	ascribes	to	Brentano	a	deflationist	position	that he	held	throughout	his	career	in	combination	with	the	view	that	truth	pertains	primarily to	self-evident	judgment	(see	Brandl	forthcoming). Section	1	first	summarizes	the	received	view	and	then	indicates	two	problems raised	by	this	interpretation.	Section	2	explains	in	which	sense	Brentano	may	have	been a	deflationist	and	how	this	interpretation	avoids	the	problems	of	the	received	view. 1.	The	Received	View	on	Brentano's	Account	of	Truth In	1930,	Oskar	Kraus	first	published,	under	the	title	Wahrheit	und	Evidenz	(The	True	and the	Evident,	1966),	a	collection	of	writings	by	Brentano	on	truth.	In	the	introduction	to this	collection	Kraus	presents	a	narrative	that	he	followed	in	organising	the	volume:	Part 2 I	of	his	collection	is	supposed	to	represent	Brentano's	early	view	as	it	is	expressed	most clearly	in	a	lecture,	"On	the	concept	of	truth",	that	Brentano	delivered	to	the	Vienna Philosophical	Society	in	1889.	This	view	Brentano	is	said	to	have	held	until	about	19012.	In	part	II	Kraus	presents	documents	from	what	he	describes	as	a	transitional	period during	which	Brentano	came	to	reject	the	correspondence	theory	and	moved	towards his	later	doctrine	that	only	real	things	exist	and	form	the	proper	objects	of	our	thoughts ('reism';	see	CHAP.	16).	At	this	time	Brentano	presumably	also	discovered	the importance	of	self-evident	judgments	for	our	understanding	of	the	concept	of	truth.	Part III	in	Kraus's	collection	finally	documents	what	Kraus	calls	Brentano's	mature	view, according	to	which	our	concept	of	truth	is	grounded	in	the	experience	of	self-evident judgments. Kraus,	and	many	scholars	after	him,	have	done	much	to	flesh	out	this	narrative with	further	details.	One	important	point	concerns	Brentano's	criticism	of	the correspondence	theory	in	its	classical	form.	According	to	Brentano,	the	theory	is	built	on the	mistaken	premise	that	all	judgements	have	a	subject-predicate	form.	Thus	it	is presumed	that	a	judgement	of	the	form	'S	is	P'	is	true	if	and	only	if	a	relation	of instantiation	holds	between	the	object	and	the	property	denoted	by	the	terms	'S'	and	'P' respectively.	Brentano	challenges	this	view	by	pointing	out	that	it	does	not	apply	to simple	judgements	of	the	form	'S	exists',	because	the	predicate	'exist'	does	not	denote	a property.	Brentano	goes	even	further	in	suggesting	that	all	judgements	can	be represented	as	having	non-propositional	content:	they	are	judgements	that	either	accept or	reject	the	existence	of	an	object	(see	CHAP.	10).	While	this	undermines	the	classical correspondence	theory,	which	focuses	on	correspondence	between	propositions	and facts,	it	still	leaves	open	the	possibility	of	a	non-traditional	correspondence	theory, where	the	correspondence	is	between	judgments	and	entities	other	than	facts. This	has	led	advocates	of	the	received	view	to	propose	that	Brentano experimented	with	various	ontological	innovations	to	revise	and	improve	the correspondence	theory.	In	the	case	of	a	positive	judgement,	they	take	him	to	consider non-real	objects	("irrealia")	as	potential	objects	corresponding	with	true	judgements. For	instance,	the	judgement	'There	was	a	king'	is	about	a	real	king	that	may	no	longer exist,	but	the	judgment	nevertheless	corresponds	with	something,	namely	with	a propositional	entity	that	is	not	a	real	thing	for	Brentano.	Entities	like	the	existence	of	a former	king	are	sometimes	called	'states	of	affairs'.	In	the	case	of	negative	judgements, 3 similar	moves	may	be	considered.	The	judgement	'There	are	no	unicorns',	despite	being a	judgment	about	something	non-existing,	may	be	said	to	correspond	with	the	state	of affairs	that	no	unicorns	exist.	Equally,	the	statement	'No	object	can	be	both	round	and square'	may	be	said	to	correspond	with	the	impossibility	of	round	squares	or	with	the necessary	state	of	affairs	that	a	figure	instantiating	both	properties	does	not	exist	(see Chrudzimski	2001:	60). Turning	now	to	Brentano's	mature	conception	of	truth,	the	received	view	holds that	Brentano	arrived	at	this	view	because	of	his	scruples	to	inflate	ontology	too	much	in order	to	meet	the	demands	of	the	correspondence	theory.	The	idea	that	truth	pertains primarily	to	self-evident	judgements	seemed	to	offer	him	an	alternative.	But	it	required the	solution	of	another	problem,	since	self-evidence	is	found	only	in	judgments	that	are infallible	or	at	least	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt.	According	to	Brentano,	there	are	two areas	in	which	we	can	judge	with	self-evidence:	when	we	make	judgements	whose denial	would	lead	to	an	obvious	contradiction,	or	when	we	form	judgements	on	the	basis of	inner	perception.	An	example	of	a	self-evident	judgment	of	the	first	kind	would	be	the judgment	that	every	cause	has	an	effect	or	that	two	is	not	identical	with	one.	These	are axioms	that	are	beyond	any	reasonable	doubt	and	therefore	self-evident. The	same holds	according	to	Brentano	when	we	judge	about	the	existence	of	a	current	sensation or	consider	whether	every	judgement	presupposes	the	presentation	of	an	object. Provided	that	inner	perception	clearly	shows	us	what	we	are	judging	in	these	cases,	we cannot	doubt	that	what	it	shows	us	exists,	and	therefore	these	judgements	are	also	selfevident	(see	Brentano	1966b:	123-34). Now	the	problem	is	that	judgements	may	be	true	without	being	self-evident,	or	as Brentano	says,	despite	being	"blind"	judgements	(1966b:	110).	This	is	why	Brentano suggests,	according	to	the	received	view,	that	a	definition	of	truth	involves	two	parts:	it defines	truth	first	for	self-evident	judgements	and	secondly	for	those	judgements	that are	not	self-evident.	In	an	undated	manuscript	that	the	editors	presume	not	to	have been	written	before	1914,	Brentano	says: "a	true	judgement"	means	originally	as	much	as	a	self-evident	judgment.	In	the	secondary	sense also,	a	non-self-evident	judgment	is	called	true,	if	it	corresponds	in	all	other	respects	with	a	selfevident	one.	(transl.	in	Szrednicki	1965:	135)i 4 There	are	two	respects	in	which	a	blind	judgement	must	agree	with	a	self-evident	one	to be	true:	the	judgement	must	have	the	same	object	and	it	must	have	the	same	quality, which	means	that	it	must	be	a	positive	judgment	if	the	self-evident	judgment	is	positive, or	a	negative	judgment	if	the	self-evident	judgment	is	negative.	What	is	not	required	in this	explication	is	a	correspondence	relation	between	a	true	judgment	and	some	thing	in reality.	Such	a	relation	does	not	obtain	in	those	cases	when	a	self-evident	judgment denies	the	existence	of	an	object.	In	the	quotation	above,	Brentano	still	speaks	of	a	form of	correspondence,	but	this	is	a	relation	between	two	judgements,	namely	a	blind judgement	and	a	self-evident	one.	As	Brentano	makes	clear	in	other	passages,	this relation	is	not	a	normal	one,	since	the	requirement	merely	says	that	a	true	judgement agrees	with	how	a	subject	would	judge	if	she	were	to	make	the	same	judgement	with self-evidence	(see	1966b:	122). Given	the	texts	collected	by	Kraus,	the	narrative	of	Brentano's	changing	views	on truth	may	seem	completely	convincing.	Doubts	about	this	interpretation	arise,	however, when	one	considers	the	costs	of	this	interpretation.	The	received	view	seems	to	be uncharitable	to	Brentano	in	several	respects. First,	it	downgrades	the	importance	of	his	earlier	writings	on	truth.	This	includes not	only	the	Vienna	lecture	of	1889,	but	also	his	Würzburg	lectures	on	Metaphysics, where	Brentano	already	exposes	his	main	points	in	a	chapter	entitled	"Vom	On	Hos Alethes"	(On	Being	in	the	Sense	of	Truth,	MS	96:	104-13). Secondly,	the	received	view	is	uncharitable	to	Brentano	because	it	assumes	that he	overlooked	the	obvious	problems	that	ensue	from	allowing	non-real	things	to	appear in	a	correspondence	relation	with	true	judgments.	Suppose	that	a	subject	correctly judges	that	there	are	no	humans	with	three	legs	but	falsely	judges	that	there	are	no tables	with	three	legs	either.	Both	judgements	may	have	as	"correlates",	as	Brentano puts	it,	a	non-real	thing	(or	rather	pseudo-thing):	the	non-existence	of	three-legged humans	and	the	non-existence	of	three-legged	tables.	These	objects	may	be	said	to correlate	with	the	two	judgements	like	'being	left	to'	correlates	with	'being	right	to'	or 'cause'	correlates	with	'effect'.	But	if	such	correlates	can	be	introduced	for	every judgment,	then	one	cannot	explain	the	difference	between	a	true	and	a	false	judgement by	saying	that	the	former,	but	not	the	latter,	corresponds	with	a	non-real	thing	(see Brandl,	forthcoming). 5 Thirdly,	as	several	commentators	have	noted,	Brentano's	mature	view	that	truth pertains	primarily	to	self-evident	judgments	raises	some	serious	problems	when considered	as	a	definition	of	truth	(see	Stegmüller	1969,	Kamitz	1983,	Künne	2003). Perhaps	the	most	severe	problem	is	that	such	a	definition	becomes	circular	unless	one	is willing	to	give	up	a	very	basic	realist	intuition. Suppose	we	ask	how	a	subject	would respond	to	a	question	'p?'	when	the	answer	is	not	known	to	us,	and	suppose	we	add	that we	are	assuming	that	this	person	will	know	the	answer	on	the	basis	of	a	self-evident judgment.	If	we	have	no	independent	reason	to	believe	that	the	person	we	ask	possesses such	knowledge,	we	must	find	out	ourselves	what	the	answer	to	our	question	is.	How else	should	we	know	how	someone	would	judge	in	this	case,	whether	or	not	she	does	so with	self-evidence?	This	consideration	strongly	suggests	that	the	question	'Is	p	true?'	is more	basic	than	the	question	'What	would	a	person's	self-evident	judgment	be	in	this matter?'.	But	if	the	question	'Is	p	true?'	is	the	basic	one	here,	then	a	definition	of	truth that	includes	the	clause	'how	a	subject	would	judge	with	self-evidence'	becomes	circular. The	circularity	is	unavoidable	given	our	realist	intuitions.	From	this	perspective, a	judgement	is	not	true	because	it	would	agree	with	a	self-evident	judgement,	but conversely:	it	would	agree	with	a	self-evident	judgement	because	it	is	true.	A	definition of	truth	in	terms	of	self-evidence	therefore	seems	to	be	warranted	only	if	one	gives	up this	realist	view	and	conceives	of	the	agreement	between	true	and	self-evident judgments	as	that	which	makes	a	true	judgement	true.	Such	a	view	might	be	congenial	to advocates	of	some	version	of	idealism.	That	Brentano	subscribed	to	a	view	with	such implications	is	hard	to	believe. 2.	The	New	Interpretation Charles	Parsons	was	the	first	to	note	that	Brentano's	early	writings	on	truth	do	not necessarily	support	the	view	that	the	received	interpretation	ascribes	to	him.	While Brentano	talks	in	his	1889	lecture	as	if	his	goal	was	a	mere	revision	of	the correspondence	theory,	what	he	actually	proposed	at	the	end	of	this	lecture	was	a	much bolder	idea.	He	makes	clear	that	in	explicating	the	concept	of	truth	we	can	do	completely without	the	notion	of	'correspondence'	or	any	of	its	cognates	like	'harmonizing	with reality'	or	'fitting	with	reality'.	This	is	what	his	final	conclusion	reveals: 6 Following	Aristotle's	statement	...	we	can	say:	a	judgment	is	true	if	it	asserts	of	some	object	that	is, that	the	object	is,	or	if	it	asserts	of	some	object	that	is	not,	that	the	object	is	not	–	and	a	judgment is	false	if	it	contradicts	that	which	is,	or	that	which	is	not.	(Brentano	1966b:	21)	ii This	statement	is	not	only	reminiscent	of	similar	claims	in	Aristotle,	it	also	anticipates the	equivalence	principles	that	deflationists	currently	use	in	explicating	the	meaning	of the	predicate	'true',	for	instance	the	principle	used	in	Horwich's	minimalist	theory	of truth: (E)	The	proposition	that	p	is	true	if	and	only	if	p. According	to	Horwich,	it	is	the	"underived	acceptance	of	the	equivalence	schema"	that constitutes	the	meaning	of	the	truth-predicate	(Horwich	2010:	27).	The	principle	that Brentano	derives	from	Aristotle	differs	from	schema	(E)	in	using	object-variables instead	of	propositional	variables.	It	therefore	accords	nicely	with	Brentano's	claim	that in	making	a	judgment	we	are	not	accepting	a	proposition	as	true,	but	we	are	accepting objects	as	existing	or	rejecting	them	as	non-existing.	A	slightly	more	perspicuous formulation	of	the	principle	makes	this	transparent: (B) A	judgment	of	the	form	'X	exists',	'X	does	not	exist',	'No	X	exists',	or	'No	non-X exists'	is	true,	respectively,	if	and	only	if	an	X	exists,	an	X	does	not	exist,	a	nonX	exists,	or	a	non-X	does	not	exist. Another	important	difference	between	this	principle	and	principle	(E)	concerns	the limited	generality	of	(B).	As	it	stands,	it	is	not	a	principle	about	all	judgments	but	only about	those	of	a	particular	form.	Brentano	believed,	however,	that	he	had	a	method	for overcoming	this	restriction.	His	plan	was	to	show	that	all	judgments	either	have existential	form	or	can	be	explained	as	combinations	of	such	judgments	(see	Brandl 2014;	also	CHAP.	10).	If	one	grants	Brentano	that	this	is	possible	–	and	this	is	of	course	a large	concession	–	principle	(B)	may	be	considered	as	equally	powerful	as	principle	(E). Parsons	restricts	his	claim	that	Brentano	was	a	precursor	of	contemporary deflationism	to	Brentano's	early	period.	He	agrees	in	this	with	the	received	view	that	in his	later	years	Brentano	held	a	theory	of	truth	that	must	count	as	robust,	since	it	defines truth	in	epistemic	terms.	But	in	this	respect,	too,	an	alternative	interpretation	is available. 7 Brentano	mentions	already	in	his	1889	lecture	that	defining	a	concept	(either implicitly	or	explicitly)	is	not	the	only	way	one	can	explicate	it.	As	a	concept	empiricist, he	believes	that	we	could	not	understand	a	concept	if	we	had	not	appropriate experiences	on	which	our	understanding	is	grounded:	"The	ultimate	and	most	effective means	of	elucidation",	Brentano	says,	"must	consist	in	an	appeal	to	the	individual's intuition,	from	which	all	our	general	criteria	are	derived"	(1966b:	24-5). There	is	then	no	need	to	ascribe	to	Brentano	a	new	definition	of	truth	when	he refers	to	self-evident	judgments	as	the	primary	bearers	of	truth.	His	concept	empiricism suffices	to	explain	what	Brentano	has	here	in	mind,	namely	an	argument	that	leads	him to	reject	Kant's	epistemology.	Kant's	conception	of	synthetic	a	priori	judgements	is closely	related	to	his	doctrine	that	some	of	our	concepts	are	pure	concepts	of	reason. Space	and	time	are	two	primary	examples	of	concepts	that	are	not	derived	from experience,	according	to	Kant.	Brentano	rejects	this	claim	as	unfounded	and	offers instead	an	empiricist	explication	of	space	and	time.	In	a	nutshell,	Brentano	says	that these	concepts	are	constructed	on	the	basis	of	spatial	and	temporal	experiences.	We have	experiences	of	things	in	our	vicinity,	and	experiences	of	past,	present,	and	future. We	also	notice	a	structure	in	these	experiences.	Once	such	structure	is	apparent,	we	can go	on	to	construct	on	this	basis	the	concept	of	a	three-dimensional	infinite	space,	or	the concept	of	a	temporal	continuum	that	forms	another	dimension	in	multi-dimensional space-time	(see	Brentano	1925:	26f.). Following	the	same	line,	we	can	see	how	Brentano	applies	concept	empiricism	to the	concept	of	truth.	He	starts	from	experiences	of	self-evident	judgements	that	provide us	with	a	basis	for	constructing	this	concept.	Self-evidence	here	is	not	a	subjective feeling	of	certainty,	or	a	compulsion	to	judge	this	way	or	that	way,	as	Brentano emphasizes.	Therefore,	he	is	confident	that	a	notion	of	truth	based	on	such	experiences can	pass	as	an	objective	notion. This	interpretation	overcomes	the	problems	facing	the	received	view	of Brentano's	account	of	truth.	As	a	deflationist,	Brentano	has	no	need	to	appeal	to	non-real (pseudo-)things	as	the	terms	of	a	correspondence	relation.	When	Brentano	introduced non-real	things,	he	did	this	in	the	context	of	his	theory	of	intentionality,	where	he considered	non-real	things	as	playing	the	role	of	mere	objects	of	thought	(see	CHAP.	4) From	this	one	should	not	conclude	that	he	gave	these	objects	also	an	important	role	to 8 play	in	his	account	of	truth.	Equally,	the	difficulty	with	explicating	truth	in	terms	of	selfevident	judging	disappears.	That	the	experience	of	self-evidence	is	indispensable	for acquiring	the	concept	of	truth,	as	Brentano	claims,	does	not	imply	that	it	is	also indispensable	to	the	nature	or	essence	of	truth.	The	deflationist	principle	(B)	makes	this clear,	since	it	contains	neither	the	concept	of	'correspondence'	nor	the	concept	of	'selfevidence'. The	question	therefore	remains,	whether	Brentano	ever	moved	beyond	his early	deflationist	position.	The	following	passage	from	a	manuscript	dated	March	1915 provides	evidence	that	he	elaborated	the	same	idea	only	further: Can	we	find	some	other	interpretation	for	'adaequtio'	which	might	make	the	thesis	[veritas	est adaequatio	rei	et	intellectus]	more	acceptable?	My	answer	would	be	that	the	thesis	tells	us	no	more nor	less	than	this:	Anyone	who	judges	that	a	certain	thing	exists,	or	that	it	does	not	exist,	or	that	it	is possible,	or	impossible,	or	that	it	is	thought	of	by	someone,	or	that	it	is	believed,	or	loved,	or	hated, or	that	it	has	existed,	or	will	exist,	judges	truly	provided	that	the	thing	in	question	does	exist,	or does	not	exist,	or	is	possible,	or	is	impossible,	or	is	thought	of,	etc.	(Brentano	1966b:	122) References Brandl,	Johannes.	2014.	"Brentano's	Theory	of	Judgment."	In	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of Philosophy	(Summer	2014	Edition),	edited	by	Edward	N.	Zalta: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/brentano-judgment/ ---	forthcoming.	"Was	Brentano	an	Early	Deflationist	about	Truth?" Chrudzimski,	Arkadiusz.	2001.	Intentionalitätstheorie	beim	frühen	Brentano.	Kluwer Academic	Publishers. Horwich,	Paul.	2010.	Truth,	Meaning,	Reality.	Oxford	University	Press. Kamitz,	Reinhard.	1983.	"Franz	Brentano:	Wahrheit	und	Evidenz."	In	Grundprobleme	der Grossen	Philosophen.	Philosophie	der	Neuzeit	III,	edited	by	Josef	Speck,	160-97. Göttingen:	Vandenhoeck	&	Ruprecht. Kastil,	Alfred.	1934.	"Ontologischer	und	gnoseologischer	Wahrheitsbegriff."	In	Zur Philosophie	der	Gegenwart,	23-34:	Brentano	Gesellschaft. 9 Krantz,	Susan.	1990/91.	"Brentano's	Revision	of	the	Correspondence	Theory."	Brentano Studien	3:	79-87. Kraus,	Oskar.	1966.	"Introduction."	In	Franz	Brentano:	The	True	and	the	Evident,	edited by	Oskar	Kraus,	xi-xxix.	London:	Routledge	1966. Künne,	Wolfgang.	2003.	Conceptions	of	Truth.	Oxford	University	Press. Parsons,	Charles.	2004.	"Brentano	on	Judgment	and	Truth."	In	The	Cambridge Companion	to	Brentano,	edited	by	Dale	Jacquette,	168-96:	Cambridge	University Press. Stegmüller,	Wolfgang.	1969.	Main	Currents	in	Contemporary	German,	British,	and American	Philosophy. Vol.	31:	Bloomington,	Indiana	University	Press. Szrednicki,	Jan.	1965.	Franz	Brentano's	Analysis	of	Truth. The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. van	der	Schaar,	Maria.	1999.	"Evidence	and	the	Law	of	Excluded	Middle:	Brentano	on Truth."	In	The	Logica	Yearbook	1998,	edited	by	Timothy	Childers:	Filosofia. ---.	2003.	"Brentano	on	Logic,	Truth	and	Evidence."	Brentano	Studien	10:	119-50. i	The	manuscript,	entitled	"Kurzer	Abriss	einer	allgemeinen	Erkenntnislehre",	was	published	in	an	earlier collection	of	Brentano's	epistemological	writings	(Brentano	1925)	and	therefore	not	included	in	Kraus's collection	of	1930.	It	is	translated	and	published	with	related	material	not	included	in	Kraus's	collection	in the	appendix	of	Szrednicki	1965.	The	translation	in	Szrednicki	1965	has	been	amended	by	replacing 'evident'	by	'self-evident'. ii	I	corrected	the	English	translation	to	make	it	fit	the	German	original:	„wahr	sei	ein	Urteil	dann,	wenn	es von	etwas,	was	ist,	behaupte,	dass	es	sei;	und	von	etwas,	was	nicht	ist,	leugne,	dass	es	sei."	Chisholm unfortunately	translates	„leugnen,	dass	ist"	as	"asserting	that	is	not",	thereby	mislocating	the	negation	in the	content	and	not	in	the	quality	of	the	judgment.